

The Military and National Reconciliation: German Lessons for Korea's Reunification

A Monograph

by

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2017

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 25-05-2017		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) JUN 2016 – MAY 2017	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The Military and National Reconciliation: German Lessons for Korea's Reunification				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ Youngjae Kim				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Advanced Military Studies Program.				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT This paper examines the role of the Republic of Korea military in national reconciliation following Korean reunification. It is important to build a sound basis for unification before the need to unify Korea eventually presents itself. When considering the military as a crucial driving factor of national power in the DPRK, the success in integrating the militaries of the two Koreas will weigh heavily on the success or failure of Korea's reunification. Since the collapse of the Cold War in 1991, the Korean peninsula remains the only divided nation in the world, and the Korean peninsula has been facing a new Cold War frontier. A number of recent studies examining possible preparations for Korean reunification through political, diplomatic and economic approaches have been based on the German unification model. It is true that successful political, diplomatic and economic integration has contributed to the German national unification. However, most importantly, this was possible because the national unification was backed by successful military integration. Based on lessons from the German military's contribution to their national unification, this paper suggests ways in which the Korean military can contribute to the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula that take lessons from the German experience and fit these within Korea's unique circumstances.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS The role of the Republic of Korea military in national reconciliation following Korean reunification.					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			MAJ Youngjae Kim
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	55	19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code) 210-284-1761

Monograph Approval Page

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Abstract

The Military and National Reconciliation: German Lessons for Korea's Reunification, by MAJ Youngjae Kim, Republic of Korea Army, 55 pages.

This paper examines the role of the Republic of Korea military in national reconciliation following Korean reunification. It is important to build a sound basis for unification before the need to unify Korea eventually presents itself. When considering the military as a crucial driving factor of national power in the DPRK, the success in integrating the militaries of the two Koreas will weigh heavily on the success or failure of Korea's reunification. Since the collapse of the Cold War in 1991, the Korean peninsula remains the only divided nation in the world, and the Korean peninsula has been facing a new Cold War frontier. A number of recent studies examining possible preparations for Korean reunification through political, diplomatic and economic approaches have been based on the German unification model. It is true that successful political, diplomatic and economic integration has contributed to the German national unification. However, most importantly, this was possible because the national unification was backed by successful military integration. Based on lessons from the German military's contribution to their national unification, this paper suggests ways in which the Korean military can contribute to the eventual reunification of the Korean peninsula that take lessons from the German experience and fit these within Korea's unique circumstances.

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Acknowledgement

I would like to express my sincere thanks to the Republic of Korea Army and the School of Advanced Military Studies for the opportunity to pursue this study. The School of Advanced Military Studies faculty have, over the past ten months, exposed me to a captivating body of knowledge in military theory in general, and in operational art in particular. Each individual faculty member has provided profound insights, fresh perspectives, and food for thought.

Special thanks are owed to my monograph director, Mr. Eric P. Price, whose continuous encouragement, guidance, and expertise was particularly valuable to define, organize, and focus the endeavor of writing this thesis. Without his suggestions and guidance, I would never have completed this work. At the same time, ROKA Liaison officer, Lieutenant Colonel Kyoungwan Jung's dedication, mentorship, and appreciation provided me with a strong source of constant challenge and motivation in writing this paper.

I must also appreciate my mentor, the United States Army LTG(R) John D. Johnson, who has shown me by his examples how to live a life as a military officer. During one year and a half at the Eighth US Army, I had the privilege to work with him and his command group. As his the ROK Army aide-de-camp, I learned invaluable lessons such as his passion, selflessness, sincerity, and humbleness.

Finally, I am grateful for the tremendous support of my wife, Minjeoung, and of my two boys, Kyounghun (Ryan) and Donghun (Stephen), for their love and extreme patience in getting through this process. I would also like to acknowledge the love and support I received from my parents in Korea. Without their support, I could not have succeeded.

Acronyms

DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany (or West Germany)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic (or East Germany)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
KPA	Korean People's Army (or North Korean Armed Forces)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NVA	Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army)
PRC	People's Republic of China (or China)
ROK	Republic of Korea
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War II

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Introduction

The function of the historian is neither to love the past nor to emancipate himself from the past, but to master and understand it as the key to the understanding of the present.

—Edward Hallett Carr, *What is History?*

Following the establishment of separate governments of East and West Germany at the end of World War II (WWII), the two Germanys embarked on very different political and economic development paths. East Germany was the most successful of the Eastern Bloc economies but still lagged behind West Germany's rapid economic ascendancy. Seeking political freedom, many educated East Germans sought refuge in the West. This "brain drain" further hampered East Germany's economic development and as conditions grew increasingly more difficult, the number of people who moved from East to West continuously increased. Finally, because of a deepening distrust of the government, the number of East German residents fleeing the country rose sharply in 1989. This wave of departures, coupled with stiffening resistance to the government by those remaining behind, eventually forced the East German government to renounce communism and welcome national unification.

Just over two decades later, a similar phenomenon is occurring on the Korean peninsula. In recent years, the number of inhabitants defecting from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (the DPRK, or North Korea) to the Republic of Korea (the ROK, or South Korea) has increased rapidly. In May 2016, twelve North Koreans waitresses, working at a restaurant in China, defected.¹ A month later, a North Korean student who was part of an official delegation to the International Mathematical Olympiad at Hong Kong also sought refuge in the South Korea consulate in Hong

¹ Yongsoo Lee and Myong-song Kim, "More N. Korean Restaurant Staff Escape from China," *Chosunilbo*, May 24, 2016, accessed October 11, 2016, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/05/24/2016052400868.html.

Kong.² Even the second highest North Korean diplomat in its London embassy defected to South Korea in August 2016.³ Though the steady increase in defections has fallen off considerably since Kim Jong Un assumed control of the North in 2011, the overall trend suggests that not only are rank and file North Korean citizens perturbed with conditions in the DPRK, but so too are members of the North Korean elite.




Figure 1. The number of North Korean Defectors

Source: Data adapted from Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, “The number of North Korean Defectors,” accessed on March 3, 2017, <http://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1440>.

² Kil-seong Lee and Myong-song Kim, “N. Korean math whiz defects to Seoul’s consulate in Hong Kong,” *Chosunilbo*, July 29, 2016, accessed October 11, 2016, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/07/29/2016072900667.html.

³ Sang-hun Choe and Rick Gladstone, “North Korea’s No. 2 Diplomat in London Defects to the South,” *The New York Times*, August 22, 2016, accessed October 11, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/18/world/asia/north-korea-defector-thae-yong-ho-britain.html?_r=1.

If history is a guide, the increases in North Korean defections suggests that the DPRK could soon falter and this situation requires specific preparations for potential unification on the Korean peninsula. Overcoming the artificial division of South and North Korea is a task that the vast majority of Koreans feel must be accomplished in the future. Globally, democracy appears to have won out over communist ideology in the Cold War that dominated the latter half of the Twentieth Century. Economically, capitalist systems have outpaced communist economic growth, and this is certainly the case on the Korean peninsula – the ROK is outpacing the DPRK. Despite South Korea's apparent success when compared to the North, the two Koreas remain separated.

Just as a good sailor must see beyond the tip of the iceberg and estimate the submerged portion of the iceberg in order to avoid a collision, the ROK must carefully chart the likely trajectory of the DPRK's future. North Korea has recently increased diplomatic pressure on ROK and the international security environment with demonstrations of their increasing military capability such as nuclear weapon and ballistic missile tests. Since Kim Jong Un rose to power, he has only increased the level of terror against his own people, and employed threatening behavior toward the ROK and its allies. Despite indicators that the DPRK's economic situation is becoming increasingly dire, Kim continues to emphasize policies of military strength and diplomatic isolation, which makes for unbearable living conditions for the majority of North Koreans. Such conditions, like those of East Germany more than two decades earlier, only increase the likelihood of failure of the North Korean state.

The Potential for Collapse

Based on current conditions on the Korean peninsula, there are two probable scenarios for a sudden regime collapse in DPRK. The first and most predictable scenario is an internal collapse brought on by a power struggle within the ruling cabinet or a popular uprising leading to civil war.⁴ In December 2011, when the former dictator Kim Jong Il passed away, Kim Jong Un, who is Kim Jong Il's third son, succeeded the elder Kim as the head of state.⁵ Since assuming power, the younger Kim has been seeking to gain a tighter grip of control over his cabinet by executing leaders and potential rivals. The executions have targeted those who represent competing interests, the most notable being the execution of his uncle, Jang Sung Taek.⁶ Furthermore, Kim Jong Un ordered the assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, who was educated as successor of Kim Jong Il.⁷ However, despite the terror associated with his rule, it seems likely that unrest will grow among North Korean residents with the continued deterioration of the overall situation in North Korea brought on by military spending coupled with diplomatic and economic isolation.

Another possibility is that Kim may seek to circumvent internal conflict through continued military provocation that leads to war with the South, thus providing a cause around which the North Korean people can collectively rally. Since 1953, when the armistice was signed, the DPRK has committed various military provocations against South Korea, including the sinking of the

⁴ Hyung Cheol Jung, "The prospect of Chinese military engagement in a North Korean collapse and South Korea's response," (Thesis, Joint Forces Staff College of the Republic of Korea, Seoul, Korea, 2005), 7-12, quoted in Hakkeun Jin, "A Study of China's Possible Military Intervention in the Event of a Sudden Change in North Korea," (Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2011), 11-12.

⁵ Lorraine Murray, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, s.v. "Kim Jong-Eun: North Korean political official," accessed October 11, 2016, <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Kim-Jong-Eun>. Kim Jong Un, soon after the death of Kim Jong Il, was appointed as the country's supreme leader. North Korean state media also anointed him the "great successor" of the philosophy of Juche (self-reliance).

⁶ Jang Sung Taek was Kim Jong Un's uncle and the second most powerful person in North Korea. He was condemned of treason and executed by anti-aircraft gunfire in 2013.

⁷ Jose Ramos-Horta and Benedict Rogers, "Kim Jong-Nam's Assassination is a Wake-up Call to the World", *The Diplomat*, March 4, 2017, accessed March 7, 2017, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/kim-jong-nams-assassination-is-a-wake-up-call-to-the-world/>.

South Korean Navy corvette, *Cheonan*, and the artillery bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island.⁸ In addition to these very direct military provocations, the North has engaged in indirect threats to South Korea through a series of military weapons tests.

Since Kim Jong Un has come to power in 2011, the DPRK has increased the frequency of nuclear weapons tests, including two in 2016.⁹ Moreover, the DPRK has continued long and mid-range missile tests, threatening not only the ROK but also Japan and even the United States.¹⁰ Since 2011, the DPRK has conducted forty-six rocket and missile tests, including the launch of an earth observation satellite and a submarine ballistic missile launch.¹¹ Before Kim Jong Un assumed power, the DPRK conducted most of its military provocations by conventional weapons. However, judging from North Korea's current approach, Kim Jong Un may escalate future military provocations by using these strategic weapons directly against the South. Should such a scenario happen, the Mutual Defense Treaty that two nations signed in 1953 would authorize the ROK and United States to fight against the DPRK.¹² When it comes to considering recent examples of DPRK threats to the ROK and US alliance, the likelihood of ROK and US military operations against the DPRK remains very high. In the worst case, this could lead to a full-scale war.

⁸ The Cheonan sinking occurred on 26 March 2010. The battleship sank off the country's west coast, killing 46 seamen. Torpedo burst below the ship, and the shock wave caused the ship to break apart. The bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island happened on 23 November 2010. DPRK forces fired artillery shells and rockets at Yeonpyeong Island. This bombardment caused the deaths of two ROK Marines and two civilians dead and injured nineteen.

⁹ Victor Cha, "Snapshot: North Korea's Five nuclear tests," Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 9, 2016, accessed October 4, 2016, <http://beyondparallel.csis.org/fifth-nuclear-test-snapshot/>. The DPRK conducted nuclear tests a total of five times. The first one was carried out on October 9, 2006, the second on May 25, 2009, the third on February 12, 2013, the fourth on January 6, 2016, and the last on September 9, 2016. Among these five tests, the last three tests were conducted under Kim Jong Un's regime.

¹⁰ See Appendix 2. Range of DPRK's Missiles by Type.

¹¹ Sanghyun Lee, "Kim, Jong Un jibgwon ihu jung-dangeoli balsache balsa ilgi [The DPRK missile tests records after Kim Jong Un regime]," *Yonhapnews*, July 19, 2016, accessed October 2, 2016, <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/07/19/0200000000AKR20160719026700014.HTML>.

¹² *South Korea*, US Department of State, February 5, 2015, accessed September 23, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm>.

Table 1. North Korea Nuclear Tests

		Date	Significance of Date	Location	Yield (KT)
Under 18 years of Kim Jong Il	1 st	October 9, 2006	A day before Party Foundation Day	Punggye-ri Test Site, North Hamgyong Province	0.5 – 1
	2 nd	May 25, 2009	Memorial Day (US)		2 – 4
Under 4 years of Kim Jong Un	3 rd	February 12, 2013	4 days before Kim Jong Il's birthday		6 – 9
	4 th	January 6, 2016	2 days before Kim Jong Un's birthday		7 – 9
	5 th	September 9, 2016	National Foundation Day		10 (ROK MND)

Source: Data adapted from Victor Cha, “Snapshot: North Korea’s Five nuclear tests,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 9, 2016, accessed October 4, 2016, <http://beyondparallel.csis.org/fifth-nuclear-test-snapshot/>.

Table 2. North Korea Missile Tests

Date	Records	Location
August 31, 1998	North Korea launches a three-stage Taepo Dong-1 rocket with a range of 1,500-2,000 kilometers that flies over Japan. They announced that the rocket placed a small satellite into orbit	Musudan-ri Test site, North Hamgyong Province
July 4-5, 2006	North Korea test fires seven ballistic missiles, including its longest-range missile, the Taepo Dong-2. The other six tests include a combination of short- and medium-range Scud-C and Nodong ballistic missiles, but the Taepo Dong-2 fails less than a minute after launch.	
April 5, 2009	North Korea launches the three-stage Unha-2 rocket, a modified version of its long range Taepo Dong-2 ballistic missile. North Korea claims the rocket placed a satellite into orbit.	
April 13, 2012	North Korea attempts to launch a weather satellite using the Unha-3, a three-stage liquid-fueled rocket. North Korea admits that the launch is a failure.	Dongchang-ri Test site, North Pyongan Province
December 12, 2012	North Korea launches the Unha-3. Shortly after the launch the North Korean Central News Agency reports that the launch was a success and the satellite entered orbit.	
February 7, 2016	North Korea launches a long-range ballistic missile carrying what it has said is an earth observation satellite.	
July 9, 2016	North Korea tests an SLBM, the KN-11. The missile ejects from a submarine and flies approximately 500 kilometers on a lofted trajectory before splashing down in the ocean. The test appears to be a success.	

Source: Data adapted from Kelsey Davenport, “Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” Arms Control Association, August 12, 2016, accessed October 18, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.

If either of these two scenarios to play out, Chinese military intervention would be almost assured. Though the DPRK and the People's Republic of China (PRC) have had some disagreements over North Korea's efforts to strengthen capacity for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), the PRC has an interest in maintaining the status quo of two Korean states. Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow of Northeast Asia at the Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center, has noted that Chinese intervention would be conducted in the name of stability of the border between China and North Korea. Beijing's strategic objectives toward DPRK have been about protecting and maintaining Chinese security, which can best be described as China's wanting the DPRK to be a buffer state between it and South Korea.¹³ Therefore, China, for her own sake, would intervene in any violent reunification of the peninsula, either militarily or non-militarily.

Scope and Limitations

ROK military war planning includes dealing with those likely scenarios, but little work has been done on military operations in support of a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. Though reunification could be achieved through violence, either as a result of the internal conflict in the DRPK or through an outbreak of war between North and South, it is possible that hostilities between the ROK and DPRK could end with a whimper rather than a roar. In addition, when the Korean peninsula is unified, wrong actions in the process of military integration can potentially cause a great deal of damage to people and property, and if not carefully handled, Korea might face another civil war.

Even though a number of studies have been conducted on diplomatic and economic approaches to Korean unification, there is little research regarding military integration as part of the

¹³ Bruce Klingner, *New Leaders, Old Dangers: What North Korean Succession Means for the U.S.*, Background No. 2397 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, April 7, 2010), accessed November 21, 2016, <http://report.heritage.org/bg2397>.

unification process. However, considering that the military is a decisive instrument of national power in the DPRK, the success of military integration will likely determine the success or failure of Korean reunification. Since this study will explore military integration, rather than military destruction or defeat, this paper excludes discussing the collapse of the DPRK regime due to the diplomatic, economic, or hostile means, as well as the subsequent intervention of PRC on the Korean peninsula. Rather, this study will consider the role of the military in reunification resulting from popular support for national reconciliation, national unity, and how the military might contribute to social and national integration.

Approach through Precedent Analysis

Examining relevant historical examples can inform planners on the potential role of the ROK military in national reconciliation following Korean reunification. History suggests that even a peaceful reunification could occur many ways, the most likely being (1) reunification through the absorption of the weaker state, in this case the DPRK, by the stronger and more stable state and, (2) reunification through a forced even-handed approach. In the first instance, the examination of a historical case like Germany can help to reduce the potential for error. An attempt to force a more balanced merger of the two countries, as suggested in the second case, however, could potentially lead to war again after the reunification as happened in Yemen.¹⁴ If the military fails in integrating the unification process, national reunification is not possible. Therefore, ensuring successful implementation of the integrated military which can influence the success or failure of reunification is the key point and should provide a clear vision both internally and externally.

With regard to the peaceful dismantling of the national army and integration by absorbing some of the other nations' military members, integration of the German military provides many

¹⁴ Uzi Rabi, *Yemen: Revolution, Civil War and Unification* (London, United Kingdom: I.B.Tauris, 2014), 115-129.

potential lessons and implications. However, while the integration was successful in Germany, the military leaders who led integration were faced with several major problems. First, they had to determine the type of organization needed for promoting effective military integration. Second, they had to determine the number of East German or National People's Army (*Nationale Volksarmee*, or NVA) troops the West would accept. Third, they had to determine how the West would handle the weapons and ammunition of the NVA. Fourth, they had to assess how the West would handle bases and facilities in the East as well as how to build a new military administration system. Finally, they had to determine how overcome the lingering hostility felt by both sides and achieve internal integration.¹⁵ Similar problems would arise in the military integration process on the Korean peninsula. As the world's only remaining divided nation, the ROK should analyze the unification of Germany in order to identify similar circumstances and associated lessons to achieve a peaceful reunification, since these issues could happen during any future Korean military integration process. In order to apply these lessons to the unification process of the Korean peninsula, it is necessary to analyze the reasons why Germany was divided and the background of German unification and compare it with the background of the division of Korea in order to find areas of commonality.

Historical Overview

Using its strong military power, Germany began invading neighboring countries in 1939, and Germany was divided as a result of its subsequent defeat in WWII. By the end of the war, the world had begun to fracture into opposing camps, those centered on Western liberalism, like the

¹⁵ Nina Leonhard, "'Armee der Einheit': Zur Integration von NVA-Soldaten in die Bundeswehr," in *Handbuch military und Sozialwissenschaft*, ed. Sven Bernhard Gareis and Paul Klein (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), 63-64, quoted in Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], (Korea, Ministry of Unification, December 2013), 13-14, accessed August 23, 2016, http://116.67.50.138/WebBook_data4/00225715/ebook/media/src.pdf.

United States, and those centered on Communism, like the Soviet Union. Because the control of territories at war's end was managed by these two competing sides, the occupation of Germany resulted in a seemingly permanent division of Germany into two states. Pursuing a policy of liberal democracy, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), commonly referred to as West Germany, was founded in 1949. In addition, the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 accelerated this development.¹⁶ Meanwhile, the Soviet-dominated eastern portion of Germany established a communist German Democratic Republic (GDR), commonly referred to as East Germany. Though these states were abruptly divided, they differed in many respects from the level of division represented by divided Korea. The FRG and GDR had a lot in common in cultural terms, including the same language, shared historical memories, a common religion, and prosperous literature and arts. Moreover, West and East Germany continued to interact; they traded freely, and people were able to travel relatively with little interference, at least initially.¹⁷ Both German governments had control over each other's exchanges, but neither made moves early on to stop it.

Korea was also divided as a result of WWII, however, unlike Germany, Korea was not a participant in the war. Further, the division of the peninsula came not because of the danger associated with Korea's military strength, like that of German, but because of Korea's inherent military weakness, which had left it a place for foreign power games in the decades before WWII. Following Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War, Japan colonized the peninsula from 1910 to 1945, and left Korea completely exhausted of human and material resources. Furthermore, after the Japanese colonial period ended in 1945, the Korean peninsula faced with a very unstable situation both inside and outside, due to the ideological conflicts between pro-Japanese, anti-nationalist,

¹⁶ Federal Ministry of Defense, *The Bundeswehr on Operations* (Berlin, Germany: Federal Ministry of Defence, June 2009), 9.

¹⁷ M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh, "Introduction: Models of Unification," in *German Unification: Process and Outcomes*, ed. M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 6-7.

nationalist, and foreign-dependent forces. The result of this conflict was the establishment of the independent governments in South and North Korea in 1948. Consequently, the establishment of two separate governments led to a deepening of the ideological conflict, and eventually the Korean peninsula came to the tragedy of the Korean War in 1950.¹⁸ The Korean War was literally a civil war fought between Koreans. Because the war ended in stalemate, the conflict between the two sides continued after the war and exchanges between the two states had to be suppressed. The DPRK has developed under a unique form of communism and has been supported by the Soviet Union and PRC, while the ROK has developed into a nation that defends liberal democracy under the patronage of the United States. Thus, the biggest difference from the situation in Germany is that hostility has continued on the Korean peninsula because of the history of civil war between the two sides and the DPRK's incessant military provocations following the armistice between the two Koreas in 1953.

Methodology

The study aims at drawing from the experiences of German reunification model and exploring potential implications for a Korean unification. It will first review what the German military did during German reunification and then examine the challenges experienced and how the German military overcame them by analyzing the role of military in four areas of the unification process. The first is the military's role in the international relations arena and how the Bundeswehr made decisions to create support for unification within the international community. Next is the military's role in the political sphere and how military leaders from both sides were integrated into the unified German military to ease concerns about the military's cooperation with civilian leaders after unification. The social aspects of military integration, and how members of East Germany's

¹⁸ Young Jeh Kim, *Toward a Unified Korea: History and Alternatives*, (Seoul, Korea: Seoul Computer Press, 1987), 11-12.

military were integrated into the unified military is explored. Finally, the study examines the economic aspects of integration, including how weapons systems and other equipment was integrated, sold, or scrapped as part of the unification process.

Finally, the study will evaluate what the main tasks will be for the ROK military in the event of a unified Korea by considering the particulars of the strategic environment of the Korean peninsula and analyzing how the German example might be modified to achieve political, social and economic integration by the military within a Korean context.

Significance

It is important to build a sound basis for unification before the need to unify Korea actually presents itself. If the foundations are solid and well prepared, the ROK can quickly take advantage of the opportunity for national unification, needing only to adjust for circumstances as they arise. Based on the lessons learned in the precedent of the German case, the ROK could establish some basic guiding principles of unification. The ROK could unify in a manner similar to that of Germany. When considering the military as a crucial driving factor of national power in the DPRK, the success of military integration will weigh heavily on the success or failure of Korea's reunification. In other words, if the military fails to integrate during the unification process, larger scale national reunification will not be possible. Therefore, the ROK military must understand how West Germany tried to shape conditions to meet opportunity presented by a unifying Germany, and adapt the German approach to fit the conditions on the Korean peninsula. Through studying German unification as a model of peaceful military integration, the ROK military should be able to derive lessons and take advantage of German experience in the event of reunification on the Korean peninsula.

The Bundeswehr as an “Army of Unity”

The history of humankind has developed in the direction in which individual rights and, personal freedoms are guaranteed. Communist regimes rule at the expense of individual freedoms, infringing upon human rights. German unification expressed this idea symbolically. As the FRG established a solid, working democracy and achieved significant wealth and prosperity, people in GDR looked admiringly toward the West. It is well known that a broad cross section of the German community supported unification. This meant that citizens were a major contributor to achieving a peaceful reunification. It is important to study how the German military planned for unification given this popular support.

Process and Characteristics

In 1989, when Hungary opened its border with Austria, approximately thirty thousand East German residents escaped to West Germany through the two countries. Afterward, until September 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down, nearly two hundred and twenty thousand East Germany people moved to West Germany through Czechoslovakia and Poland.¹⁹

After the opening of the Berlin Wall, the demands for unification from East German citizens increased rapidly. According to Horst Teltschik, the former Foreign Affairs and National Security Adviser to Helmut Kohl, the chancellor of Germany from 1982 to 1998, a sudden increase in the GDR migrants might indicate that the end of the GDR regime began. At the same time, the West German government’s biggest concern was how to prevent a flood of residents because the government did not have enough resources on hand to handle large numbers of immigrants in a relatively short period.²⁰

¹⁹ Philip D. Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 63-66.

²⁰ Horst Teltschik, *329 Tage*, trans. Ki-baek Yi (Seoul: Han Madang, 1993), 9-11.

Helmut Kohl realized the GDR was facing a dead-end, and during a government address, he suggested to the East that they give up their economic monopolies, allow independent political parties, and hold free elections. In addition, he expressed the West's intention to support the East German economy if the GDR carried a wide range of economic reforms.²¹ Still, Kohl wanted to avoid hasty decisions that might provoke Germany's neighbors. He understood the diplomatic issues of German unification should be made with consideration of its allies and the Soviet Union.²² When the Berlin Wall opened on November 9, 1989, and both German people communicated freely, Kohl believed that the unification of Germany was just around the corner. On November 10, 1989, after an official visit to Poland, Kohl exchanged views over the phone with George W. Bush, François Mitterrand, Margaret Thatcher, and Mikhail Gorbachev.²³ In a speech in Berlin, Kohl appealed to the citizens of Berlin to act wisely and not lose prudence. He emphasized that the German people should contemplate and take a step forward to the future, to collaborate between the two Germanys. In addition, he expressed his appreciation to the United States, England, and France for supporting the freedom and unity of Berlin over the past half century.²⁴

On November 28, 1989, Kohl suggested a broad picture for the German unification by proposing ten unification policies. According to Teltschik, who prepared this program, this suggestion included two critical concepts. There was (1) the process toward the unification coordinated with East Germany, and (2) the synchronization German unification within an international relationship.²⁵

²¹ Zelikow and Rice, 79-81.

²² Ronald D. Asmus, *German Unification and Its Ramifications* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1991), 6-7.

²³ Helmut Kohl knew it was important to talk with the four victorious nations to prepare for German unification in the near future.

²⁴ Horst Teltschik, 13-16.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 44-46.

In the GDR, on the other hand, the government did not assume that the removal of the Berlin Wall necessarily meant reunification, but instead continued trying to correct the course of East German politics. However, by January 1990, approximately two thousand East Germany people moved to the West every day. Therefore, to resolve this emerging national crisis the GDR decided to hold early elections, and so East Germans cast their first free ballot to elect delegates on March, 1990.²⁶ As a vote results came in, the conservative party coalition, “Alliance for Germany” (*Allianz fürfor Deutschland*)” swept the elections, claiming the result signaled widespread desire that claimed to push for early reunification with West Germany. Accepting the people’s opinion, the GDR decided to compose a new government and thus, for the first time since 1945 a peaceful regime change took place in East Germany, the destabilizing movement of East Germans to the West subsided.²⁷ After that, both sides began specific discussions on integration and the realization of the reunification of the two Germanys.

In late 1989, as expectations for German unification increased, military leaders of the West began secret discussions on a military integration plan for reunification. The Defense Minister, the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, vice chairman, and other senior leaders attended this meeting. From this meeting, an informal working group was established and tasked to design a plan for military integration of the East German and West German militaries. The group submitted its plan on February 7, 1990, in which they suggested four principles for the integration of the two militaries.²⁸

1. There must be only one army.

²⁶ Henry Krisch, “Delegitimation of the Old Regime: Reforming and Transforming Ideas in the Last Years of the GDR,” in *German Unification: Process and Outcomes*, ed. M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 62-66.

²⁷ Zelikow and Rice, 230-232.

²⁸ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 17-18.

2. NVA should withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.
3. Unified Germany should be a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member.
4. No NATO troops should be stationed in East German territory.

West German military leaders, without any coordination with the NVA, decided unilaterally to disband the NVA upon unification. The FRG considered it impossible to re-educate NVA soldiers, as a representative organization of the communist dictatorship. In addition, they believed that the East German military would have a negative impact on the Bundeswehr. However, they could not determine the form and the scale of the military of the unified Germany on their own. Neither East nor West Germany were completely sovereign states following WWII, which meant they could not decide on a course without the consent of the four victorious nations.²⁹

Until June 12, 1990, Gorbachev argued that a unified Germany should be an associate in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact.³⁰ Therefore, if the decision of the West German army to disband the NVA had been made public, the international negotiation on the unification might have been at risk. Especially since Gorbachev opposed Germany withdrawing from Warsaw Pact while maintaining its status as a member of NATO. Due to these limitations, the initial assessment of West Germany's military leaders was to keep these early assessments secret.

Within this atmosphere, while the newly-elected conservative party coalition in the GDR pushed for rapid German reunification, the defense minister of West Germany, Gerhard Stoltenberg, and the defense minister of the East Germany, Rainer Eppelmann, held their first meeting on April 27, 1990.³¹ This was the first meeting of the two states' military leadership since the Germany's division in 1945.

²⁹ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 17-18.

³⁰ Federal Ministry of Defense, 25.

³¹ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 18-21.

After the first meeting, the differences of opinion in the West and the East German military groups on military integration soon became apparent. On May 2, 1990, during a conference of the East German military commanders, Eppelmann claimed that the unified Germany should have “One country. Two militaries.” and concluded that he did not think German unification inevitable and that if it happened, it would take at least two years. Moreover, he believed that as long as the simultaneous presence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe remained, the NVA would stay in Germany.³²

The two German defense ministers held the second meeting on May 28, 1990, signing an agreement on allowing formal and informal contacts between East and West soldiers. However, on June 13, Stoltenberg announced that a unified Germany should maintain “One country. One military.” West Germany insisted that a united Germany should not allow the NVA or other separated forces to remain. For most West Germans, the NVA was the enemy, and represented military forces in service to communism.³³ Moreover, they felt the NVA reflected the political and social learning of the Soviet Union.³⁴ These public pronouncements created a stir within the NVA, as East German soldiers began wondering if they would be allowed to serve in the new Bundeswehr or if they would lose their status.³⁵

³² Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 19-20.

³³ They believed the NVA as the enemy and traitors; the main reason was the NVA’s alliance relation with the Soviet Union, Germany’s enemy in WWII.

³⁴ Andrew Bickford, “Soldiers, Citizens, and the State: East German Army Officers in Post-Unification Germany,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 51, no. 02, March 20, 2009, 264-265, accessed September 29, 2016, 10.1017/s0010417509000127.

³⁵ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 21-22.

However, the situation was soon solved at the most senior levels of government when Kohl and Gorbachev met on July 14, 1990, and ironed out these obstacles.³⁶ Kohl received a concession from Gorbachev allowing for a unified Germany to remain in NATO, and in turn compromised by reducing the size of the unified Bundeswehr to 370,000 by 1994. Their final agreement on the integration of German forces specified the following points.³⁷

1. German unification referred to the integration of West and East Germany and Berlin.
2. After the German unification, the four countries rights and obligations were completely destroyed. The unified Germany had full sovereignty without any limits from the moment of unification.
3. The number of federal troops in the unified Germany would be up to 370,000 and this final target should be made within three to four years. This period was equal to the time given for the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in GDR. Once Soviet troop withdrawals were completed, the number of German troops should not exceed 370,000.
4. The unified Germany would remain in NATO, and the old East German territory included the unified Germany, would also belong to NATO.
5. Immediately upon German reunification, Bundeswehr (or Federal Defense Forces of Germany) could be arranged in the region of the GDR and Berlin. In addition, once the Soviet troop withdrawal was completed, the NVA could also be integrated into NATO. However, nuclear weapons should not be placed in former East German territory and no foreign troops were allowed to be located there.

³⁶ Michael G. Huelshoff and Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., "Steps Toward Union: The Collapse of the GDR and the Unification of Germany," in *German Unification: Process & Outcomes*, ed. M. Donald Hancock and Helga A. Welsh (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 84-88.

³⁷ Horst Teltschik, 266-285.

6. The unified Germany should abandon the production of nuclear weapons and all chemical and biological reserves should be secured.
7. The unified Germany will support the Soviet withdrawal.
8. Troops stationed in Berlin from the four countries would remain at current levels forces Soviet troop withdrawals were completed, and then would withdraw to their own countries.

Shortly before reunification, the West German military had 431,000 military personnel, and working civilians in the federal forces comprised an additional 183,000 personnel. The size of the former East German military at the time was a total of 88,797 personnel, including 22,676 officers.³⁸ The Kohl-Gorbachev summit announced that the size of the entire East and West military forces of about 521,000 soldiers would be reduced to 370,000 soldiers by the end of 1994.³⁹ The German government decided to drastically reduce the size of the Federal Forces within reunified Germany in order to gain the support from neighboring countries by assuming a less-threatening posture than that of pre-WWII Germany.⁴⁰

When the two leaders decided the unified German would remain in NATO member, Epplmann amended his previous declaration on August 2, 1990, admitting that there could only be one military in the unified Germany. Also the NVA leadership pushed to incorporate as much as possible in order to make NVA troops part of the Bundeswehr after the reunification. The NVA leadership asked to put at least sixty thousand soldiers in the Bundeswehr, but the West German military argued that only fifty thousand soldiers would be placed from the former NVA. This

³⁸ Bickford, 261.

³⁹ Federal Ministry of Defense, 26.

⁴⁰ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 21.

process eventually led to the Unification Treaty which agreed that by 1994, the Bundeswehr has twenty-five percent of the former NVA soldiers and officers in its ranks.⁴¹

Contribution of Bundeswehr to the Reunification

As the integration of the military was essential to the larger framework of national unity, one should look at the Bundeswehr's contribution to national unification to glean insights for peaceful military integration. Therefore, it is important to study what the German army has done for national unification. This following section examines how the Bundeswehr supported German security, in the process of liberal settlement, and in the process of creating a unified political and social environment.

International Relations and the Establishment of a Strong, and Peaceful Military

On September 9, 1989, with the opening of the Berlin Wall, an opportunity for German unification came virtually in an instant. The FRG, who had actively pursued unification during the Cold War, saw unification as a legitimate option upon the toppling of the Berlin Wall. Conversely, the GDR was no longer in a position in which they could successfully subdue the population by force, as it had in the past. The FRG had a democratic military, the Bundeswehr, which was built upon freedom and civil society, resulting in perhaps a superior warfighting capability, with a focus on defending peace, and who over time gained the trust of both Eastern and Western societies.⁴²

After the country had signed a basic treaty for unification between the two Germanys, the FRG denounced the Hallstein Doctrine and recognized GDR as a nation. After that, the exchanges between East and West became more active and a more positive image of the West began to spread

⁴¹ Bickford, 261.

⁴² Eric Hugh Brandenburg, "National unification and transition in the German armed forces," (Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, June 1993), 15-16, accessed November 17, 2016, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36719992.pdf>.

within the GDR.⁴³ While the government endeavored in the political and diplomatic arenas, the Bundeswehr contributed to the integration of the government both inside and outside. Outwardly, the FRG tried to make clear the intended use of their warfighting capability and the peaceful intentions of the Army. Since the mid-1960s, the conventional weapons produced in Germany were excellent in performance. The technological and economic power of Germany was indispensable in creating a strong West German army. In addition, the policy towards German unification was supported by the international community by declaring abandonment of weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear weapons located within Germany. At the same time, the FRG had developed the military tactics and operations methods based on the tradition of the past German military. While expanding military exchanges with the East Germany and other Eastern European countries, West Germany showed robust capability, but also a focus on using its military forces in the maintenance of regional peace. Therefore, the East German government believed that the West would not intervene in the East even as the East faced internal turmoil.⁴⁴

Political Concerns and the Establishment of Structures for Military Integration

After meeting on July 14, 1990, Kohl and Gorbachev prepared the FRG for integration with the GDR. First, the FRG established a liaison team (*Verbindungsgruppe des Bundesministeriums der Verteidigung*) to the East German Ministry of Defense on August 17, 1990. The primary task of a liaison team was to maintain a close contact with the East German Ministry of Defense to prepare taking-over the NVA and to prepare a new organization for the Bundeswehr that would be located in the East German territory. They started work at the East German Ministry of Defense on August

⁴³ *Encyclopædia Britannica*, s.v. "Germany: The era of partition," accessed October 28, 2016, <https://www.britannica.com/place/Germany/The-era-of-partition#ref297777>. The Hallstein Doctrine (named for one of Adenauer's key foreign-policy aides, Walter Hallstein) was to refuse to maintain diplomatic relations with those countries (other than the Soviet Union) that recognized the German Democratic Republic.

⁴⁴ Federal Ministry of Defense, 13-21.

20.⁴⁵ The liaison team focused on investigating and assessing the status of troops, weapons, equipment, budgets and necessary facilities within a short period. In addition, they had to plan how to adapt the NVA command structure and determine the form of future military organization needed after unification.⁴⁶

However, in order to diffuse tensions, the liaison team from the West had to comply with four rules.⁴⁷

1. The liaison team would make no recommendations.
2. The liaison team would not exercise any influence.
3. The liaison team would only collect data.
4. The liaison team would provide proper answers to questions.

The liaison team consisted of twenty personnel. Among these personnel, nine members of the liaison team were people with ties to the East Germany. The liaison team had to examine accurately the details for military integration while working out an effective take-over plan within a short period – until the unification day, October 3, 1990.

The FRG also established the Federal Forces Eastern Command or Bundeswehr Eastern Command (*Bundeswehrkommando Ost*). When the FRG started the initiative for military integration in secret in late 1989, the FRG decided to install a headquarters in the GDR to oversee

⁴⁵ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 23.

⁴⁶ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-il-ui tong-il mich tonghabjeongchaeg yeongu* [The research of unified and integrated policy in Germany], (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Unification, December 2013), 406, accessed October 29, 2016, http://116.67.50.138/WebBook_data4/00083604/ebook/media/src.pdf.

⁴⁷ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 116-117. In March 1990, before pursuing a full-fledged military integration, the FRG sent a commissioner Friedhelm Krüger-Sprengel, to attempt to support reform of the NVA. However, conflict arose due to disagreements between him and East German leaders.

the disbanding of the NVA and the constitution of new Federal Forces.⁴⁸ These plans were already established before the Kohl – Gorbachev summit on July 14, 1990.⁴⁹ When the approach was adjusted to promote the integration of both German militaries after the summit, the FRG appointed General Jörg Schönbohm as commander of the Federal Forces Eastern Command.⁵⁰

The Federal Forces Eastern Command, which was installed shortly after reunification, was the subsidiary institution of the Federal Ministry of Defense. This command assumed the role of taking-over the former official seat of the GDR's Ministry of Defense and the NVA in Strausberg.⁵¹ After unification, approximately two thousand officers, and non-commissioned officers from the former FRG were willing to support the Federal Forces Eastern Command.⁵² General Schönbohm's main missions were to disband the units and organizations that did not comply with the Federal Command and to determine whether to discard the NVA's weapons and equipment. In addition, the Federal Forces Eastern Command supported the withdrawal of Soviet troops.⁵³

The primary concern of General Schönbohm was to lead the NVA without any problems or conflicts on the unification day, October 3, 1990. To achieve this mission, he dispatched the advance team to the Federal Forces Eastern Command and coordinated thoroughly with the NVA

⁴⁸ Johann Fritsch, "The History of the Bundeswehr, Part 2: Army of Unity," Federal Ministry of Defence, December 3, 2013, accessed October 31, 2016, https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/FcxJDoAgEAXRG3Xv3XkKh41h-IGO0BJAvb6S2r4U7_yn5pFgulxqEq-8OZnsSzY_gZq4iBohvZUrSZeT7K0e7UWsFNbc_EUHmZqBw6MeEB2el7FOgTcol5znD7YAV34!/.

⁴⁹ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-il-ui tong-il mich tonghabjeongchaeg yeongu* [The research of unified and integrated policy in Germany], 406.

⁵⁰ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 24.

⁵¹ Federal Ministry of Defense, 26.

⁵² Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-il-ui tong-il mich tonghabjeongchaeg yeongu* [The research of unified and integrated policy in Germany], 407.

⁵³ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 24-25.

generals.⁵⁴ Following unification, new military officers were placed in command of the former NVA organizations. The Ministry of Defense decided to appoint most of the commanders from West Germany and used the former NVA commanders as advisers.

Social Aspects of Internal Integration Between Both Militaries

When the German unification was coming to fruition, not all Germans were feeling positive about the prospect of a unified Germany. Many of the former NVA soldiers felt as though they were sacrificial victims to the unification effort. In fact, the Bundeswehr thought of the NVA not only as their enemy but also as traitors to Germany because the NVA was allied with the Soviet Union, Germany's arch-enemy in WWII.⁵⁵ According to Andrew Bickford, the Bundeswehr, as an "Army of Unity" was a misnomer. Bickford noted "Bundeswehr officers saw NVA officers as both expendable – regarding the reductions stipulated by the Unification treaty – and as threats to their careers."⁵⁶

In order to overcome this internal conflict, both Germanys laid the legal basis for the post-unification military with the signing of the unification treaty on August 31, 1990. The core specifications of the treaty included provisions for managing the disposition of all NVA soldiers after reunification.⁵⁷ For example, officers and non-commissioned officers of the NVA were demoted in rank.⁵⁸ In addition, according to the West German military on August 4, 1990, the

⁵⁴ Jörg Schönbohm, *Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland. Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee*, (Berlin: Der Siedler Verlag 1992), 52-53, quoted in Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper]*, 25.

⁵⁵ Bickford, 263-265.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 264.

⁵⁷ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper]*, 31-38.

⁵⁸ Hyun Lee, "An Analysis of size and structure of the Army of Reunified Korea," (Thesis, US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March 2010), 35, access November 8, 2016, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518626.pdf>.

initial number of the former NVA soldiers that could stay in the unified armed forces of Germany was five thousand.⁵⁹

However, due to the fixed number of troops that the unified German military could possess and other constraints such as service standards associated with age and gender, the final number of troops from the NVA who were eligible to join the Bundeswehr was only about eleven thousand. For instance, NVA soldiers over the age of fifty-five by 1990 were relieved of their duties and forced out of the military.

When the NVA faced this news, it created an unstable internal atmosphere. According to Bickford, even after unification, the former NVA soldiers were still perceived by West German members of the Bundeswehr as the NVA, the illegal soldier of a Cold War enemy.⁶⁰ To prevent social anxiety caused by internal differences between people, the unified German government took several actions. The Unification Treaty specified measures to set a stable social base for the former NVA soldiers. Specifically, to help forcibly retired NVA troops adapt to society, the government supported them through paying seventy percent of the last salary for a period of six to nine months and assisted the soldiers in gaining civilian job qualifications. The German Ministry of Defense supported this policy through cooperation with the Ministry of Labor (*Bundesarbeitsamt*). They provided vocational education to retired NVA soldiers, and the newly established Military Manpower Administration in East Germany hired many former NVA soldiers.⁶¹ Moreover, the

⁵⁹ Youngyun Kim and Hyunmo Yang, *Dog-il, tong-il-eseo tonghab-eulo [Germany, From unification to Integration]*, (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Unification, December 2009), 177-178, accessed November 1, 2016, http://116.67.50.138/WebBook_data1/00080820/ebook/media/src.pdf.

⁶⁰ Bickford, 266-268.

⁶¹ Ministry of Interior, Republic of Korea, *Berlin jangbyeog bung-goe 20juneon dongseodog tonghabgwajeong jonghab pyeong-ga [20th anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin Wall: Overall evaluation of German unification process]*, (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Interior, August 31, 2009), 42-44, accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.prism.go.kr/homepage/entire/retrieveEntireDetail.do?pageIndex=1&research_id=1250000-201000001&leftMenuLevel=160&cond_research_name=%EB%B2%A0%EB%A5%BC%EB%A6%B0+%EC%9E%A5%EB%B2%BD+%EB%B6%95%EA%B4%B4+20%EC%A3%BC%EB%85%84&cond_research_start_date=&cond_research_end_date=&pageUnit=10&cond_order=3.

unified German government encouraged former NVA soldiers who did join the Bundeswehr to serve in the west of German territory, which accelerated effective internal integration and socialization.

Overall, former NVA forces were reorganized and divided into three categories; (1) those that would be incorporated into the Bundeswehr, (2) those that would not be incorporated and would therefore be disbanded before March 1991, and (3) those that would not be incorporated but were needed for near-term requirements. This last group saw immediate reductions in troop strengths but were not disbanded until after March 1991.⁶²

When selecting personnel to be incorporated into the Bundeswehr, the volunteers from the NVA came under close scrutiny as the government ensured that these individuals had not participated in the suppression of human rights. Furthermore, any soldier who had worked in East German military intelligence units, psychological operations units, or the East German military court system were automatically excluded from the incorporated list.⁶³ In addition, soldiers also were excluded whose retirement age would come before June 1991. Former NVA soldiers who wished to continue working in the federal troops and passed through these various screenings were incorporated throughout the Bundeswehr in three stages.

⁶² Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 38.

⁶³ Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), *Fünf Jahre Armee der Einheit – eine Bilanz*. (Bonn, 1995), 18, quoted in Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-il-ui tong-il mich tonghabjeongchaeg yeongu* [The research of unified and integrated policy in Germany], 408.

Table 3. Procedures transferring of the NVA soldiers to the Bundeswehr

The 1 st Phase (December 1990 ~ mid of 1991)	2-year term service opportunities for 50,000 NVA soldiers (who can apply for re-selection board)
The 2 nd Phase(September 30, 1991): The primary selection	Re-select for 2-year term service for 18,000 NVA soldiers
The 3 rd Phase(September 30, 1993): Final selection	Long-term service soldiers for 10,800 NVA soldiers

Source: Data adapted from Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper]*, (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Unification, December 2013), 39, accessed October 30, 2016, http://116.67.50.138/WebBook_data4/00225715/ebook/media/src.pdf.

In addition, to achieve internal integration between soldiers, Germany has maintained its practice of “*Innere Führung* (Leadership and Civic Education).” The FRG traditionally focused on establishing liberal democratic ideals within the military. Germany, having lived through the perils of tyrannical dictatorship, had a strong will to build and preserve a democratic society. Therefore, *Innere Führung* was introduced as the primary troop information and education program from the earliest beginnings of the Bundeswehr, and through it, the Bundeswehr could maintain an open-minded armed forces with the broader society.⁶⁴ Its core concept is to induce motivation from the inside based on sound citizen consciousness through internalizing civic consciousness and treating soldiers as equal citizens. The essence of *Innere Führung* is officers and leaders who are full of liberal democratic convictions, who treat soldiers as equal individuals, and who motivates soldiers from the inside to be a peaceful army that defend the spirit of liberal democracy. As such, *Innere Führung* contributed significantly to making the Bundeswehr a natural part of German society and a dependable instrument of national security. Due to concerns about the separation of civilian and

⁶⁴ Frank Bötel, “*Innere Führung* (Leadership and Civic Education) and the Citizen in Uniform,” Federal Ministry of Defence, December 3, 2013, accessed November 17, 2016, https://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/Dce7EYAgEAXAWmyAy83sQk0cwBPegAfDz_ZINlo6aRI94HRDEh1pp8NiNZ8y73CqwnountFqThENQZkuN9ePfVEQ4cLX02e6OMphW35PddAM/.

military, Germany retained a voluntary recruitment system. Therefore, positive changes in the military have made a significant contribution to the creation and preservation of free democratic ideals throughout society, and vice versa.

Economic Considerations for Integrating Weapons and Equipment

The NVA was the most well-armed country among the countries who joined the Warsaw Pact and they had an enormous amount of weapons and equipment. At the time of the unification, the Bundeswehr acquired a lot of equipment including tanks, aircraft, naval vessels, small arms, and ammunition (see Table 4).⁶⁵

Table 4. The size of acquired weapons and equipment from the NVA

Type	Details
Combat equipment	2,300 Tanks / 9,000 Armored vehicles / 5,000 Field artillery and Air defense artillery tubes
Small Arms	Approximately 1.2 million
Aircraft	700 total, including 368 fighters, 59 training aircraft, and 59 helicopters
Vessels	192 total, including 82 warships
Vehicles	Approximately 85,000
Ammunition	Approximately 29,500 tons
Fuel	Approximately 4,500 tons includes Rocket propulsion fuel

Source: Data from Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), Fünf Jahre Armee der Einheit – eine Bilanz. (Bonn, 1995), 24, quoted in Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-il-ui tong-il mich tonghabjeongchaeg yeongu [The research of unified and integrated policy in Germany]*, (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Unification, December 2013), 43, accessed October 29, 2016, http://116.67.50.138/WebBook_data4/00083604/ebook/media/src.pdf.

⁶⁵ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper]*, 43-44.

Because the final agreement of unification declared that the unified Germany would not possess nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, the treatment and integrating of equipment and weapons was an essential task in creating a peaceful and stable social atmosphere.

Therefore, the Federal Ministry of Defense classified materials into three categories for efficient processing: long-term use, provisionally use, and disposal. The Federal Ministry of Defense recognized the need for a separate organization to save and store acquired weapons and equipment beyond those needed for immediate use. Hence, the Federal Ministry of Defense signed a contract with a material storage company, MDSG (*Matrerialdepot Service Gesellschaft mbH*) on August 7, 1992. To perform these tasks, the Federal Ministry of Defense hired 1,820 workers, most of them from the East Germany.⁶⁶

Analysis of German Military Integration

Analysis of the military integration process shows how West German Federal Forces prepared and tried to integrate the NVA.⁶⁷ The first phase was the preparation phase from June 1990 to August 1990. During this period, both Germanys discussed efficient integrations and West Germany prepared to dispatch a liaison team to the East. At the same time, the FRG argued to remain in NATO and finally both Germanys and neighboring nations agreed the unified Germany should remain in NATO and the Soviets should withdraw from the GDR. Importantly, West Germany began thinking about and planning for the integration of the two German militaries long before a need to execute arose.

The second phase was the take-over phase from August 1990 to October 3, 1990. The FRG deployed a liaison team to the East German Ministry of Defense and prepared to dispatch an

⁶⁶ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Dog-iltong-il chongseo: gunsabun-ya tonghabgwanlyeon jeongchaegmunseo* [German Unification series: Military Integration Policy Paper], 47.

⁶⁷ Kim and Yang, 176-180.

advanced team for the Federal Forces Eastern Command that was established in the East German territory after the unification. The liaison team had to collect data for military integration while planning effective taking over plan. In addition, the West German military leaders discussed how to discharge the NVA soldiers while distinguishing the NVA political soldiers.

The third phase was a reform phase. It was between October 3, 1990, and March 1991. Since the German unification, Bundeswehr operated the Federal Forces Eastern Command to take-over the NVA command authority, support security, and stability operations in the East territory. At the same time, the West German military leaders discussed a set of standard criteria for the transfer of NVA soldiers to the Bundeswehr and provided at least some support to those who could not be incorporated into the new army.

The fourth phase was a settlement phase from March 1991 to the present. During this period, the Bundeswehr integrated the former NVA armed forces, facilities, and equipment. For example, the procedures transferring of the NVA soldiers to the Bundeswehr were completed on June 30, 1992. In addition, the Bundeswehr conducted unit relocation plans; as part of the relocation program, the Federal Ministry of Defense decided to move a number of military institutions to the old East German territory. The Bundeswehr also supported the Soviet withdrawal, which was finished on August 31, 1994.




Figure 2. German Military Integration Process

Unification of the Korean Peninsula and Military Integration

Military integration in the German reunification process was pursued peacefully without any bloody clashes. When Korean unification comes, it will hopefully follow a similar peaceful path to that of the two Germanys. Therefore, Korean military leaders should develop a suitable model for unification using lessons from the German experience to prepare for a unified military – internally and externally. In addition, in order to create a safe environment that ensures a peaceful unification and to guarantee the lives of the refugees who selected South Korea, the ROK military should continue to possess a strong military power for regional security.

The Environment for the Unification of Korea

A political scientist, Jakub J. Grygiel, brings to light the importance of the impact of combining geography and strategy. Grygiel argued that geography not only influences the fate of national power but also determines the political significance and international relationships of states by given natural features.⁶⁸ In spite of the collapse of the Cold War in 1991, the Korean peninsula has been facing a new Cold War frontier. The Korean peninsula is a strategic location in Northeast Asia. At that location, many major powers intersect: China, Russia, Japan, and the United States. All of these nations consider Korea as indispensable to their own national security.⁶⁹ Geographically, the Korean peninsula is the intersection of sea power and land power; it provides a route to land, and it serves as a gateway to the sea. Economically, Northeast Asia hosts the world's second and third largest economies.⁷⁰ The scale of the combined economies of the ROK, China, and

⁶⁸ Jakub J Grygiel, *Great Powers and Geopolitical Change* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), 5-10, 15.

⁶⁹ S. C. M. Paine, *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 33.

⁷⁰ Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, *Defense White Paper: 2014* (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of National Defense, 2014), 14-15, accessed November 7, 2016, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblict/PBLICTNEBOOK_201506161152304650.pdf.

Japan reach approximately twenty-three percent of global output. Regarding national security, the Korean peninsula could become a powder keg for the world.⁷¹ The military expenditure of the great powers around the Korean peninsula is more than fifty percent of the world. Specifically, China, who maintains communism based on the strong national power, is currently trying to expand the influence of the national power.⁷² The United States has around thirty thousand troops on the Korean peninsula for maintaining Northeast Asian security. The rise of China's assertive defense of its perceived rights in the South China Sea region and the United States' "Pivot to Asia" strategy will make their strategic cooperation and competition a larger factor in determining the stability of security in the North Asia region.⁷³ As the dual relationship between the United States and China continues, Japan and Russia also participate in the competition toward increasing national interest and influence. This phenomenon might lead to regional instability and uncertainty. Moreover, the DPRK has continued to develop WMD under the dictator Kim Jong Un, whose actions only deepen the DPRK's international isolation.

⁷¹ See Appendix 3. Northeast Asia Arms Race Map.

⁷² Ministry of National Defense Republic of Korea, 8-9.

⁷³ US Congressional Research Service, *Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration's "Rebalancing" Toward Asia (Report No. R42448)*, by Mark E. Manyin, Stephen Daggett, Ben Dolven, Susan V. Lawrence, Michael F. Martin, Ronald O'Rourke, Bruce Vaughn (Washington, DC: March 28, 2012), accessed November 21, 2016, <https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf>.

Global Distribution of Military Expenditure in 2015




Figure 3. Global Distribution of Military Expenditure in 2015

Source: Data adapted from "Military Expenditure," *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*, April 25, 2016, accessed November 15, 2016, <https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-and-military-spending/military-expenditure>.

The issue of unification of the Korean peninsula is not only a problem for the two Koreas but also a global issue. South Korea's military integration should be predicated on the notion of peaceful coexistence amongst the regions' competing interests, meaning the disbanding of Cold War structures on the Korean peninsula. As with the German example, as long as the Cold War structure remains in its present state on the Korean peninsula, it would be folly to expect a truly peaceful coexistence, military integration, and arms control.

No one can be certain that Korea's path to unification will be in any way similar to that of Germany. This is, in part, because there are many differences between the two cases, especially differences of economy and national security issues. For instance, the GDR economy was in shambles by the spring of 1990, yet even though unified Germany's GDP declined by roughly thirty percent and employment by thirty-five percent after the national unification, the GDR's economic situation was not significantly worse compared with other East European countries.⁷⁴ On the other hand, the DPRK has one of the worst economic situations in the world. In 2016, the Heritage Foundation published an empirical study of an index of economic freedom to inform the each nation's economic status. According to them, the DPRK ranked 180th, which is the lowest, and one of the main reasons is the regime's long-standing “先軍政治 (military-first policy)” and repression of economic activity by the communist party.⁷⁵ These economic conditions in the DPRK could cause serious internal problems after reunification, especially if it experienced greater decline immediately afterward, like the GDR.

Secondly, the Korean peninsula is geographically located on different circumstances regarding national security compared to what the Germany had faced. When Germany unified, and the Cold War culminated, the Soviets did not believe that Germany was a significant threat to their national security, and in fact, participated in the unification negotiations. This was not only because the NATO troops were not stationed in East German territory, but also because there were other

⁷⁴ Winfried Schneider-Deters, “The economic unification of Germany: the collapse of the East German economy and prospects for Germany's economic integration,” *Han-dok Kyongsang Hakhoe*, 9 (Seoul, Korea: Kyongsang-nochong, May 1991), 1-4; Michael C. Burda and Jennifer Hunt, “From Reunification to Economic Integration: Productivity and the Labor Market in Eastern Germany,” *Brookings papers on economic activity 2001: 2* (December 1, 2010), 1-2, accessed November 9, 2016, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/2001b_bpea_burda.pdf.

⁷⁵ The Heritage Foundation, *2017 Index of Economic Freedom: North Korea*, (The Heritage Foundation, 2017), accessed March 2, 2017, <http://www.heritage.org/index/country/northkorea>.

countries to act as a buffer zone between Germany and the Soviet Union.⁷⁶ On the other hand, a unified Korea is directly adjacent to China. As mentioned earlier, Beijing's strategic approach toward the DPRK has been about protecting Chinese national security. Therefore, finding ways to accommodate China's border security concerns would be a necessary component of unification.

Yet the biggest difference lay in the characteristics of the two militaries themselves. East Germany's NVA was an army under strong control of the Soviet Union, but the Korean People's Army (KPA) is an army capable of independent action without relying on foreign countries. It can be judged that the KPA only protects Kim Jong Un. When the Soviet Union backed Germany's unification, East Germany was forced to accept unification as directed by the Soviet Union. That is why the German prime minister, Kohl had made every effort to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Since the KPA is an organization that acts independently, acceding only to the authority of the supreme leader, it must find ways to get the rank and file to cooperate in any effort to integrate with the South in order to achieve unification. Likewise, the ROK will need to find partners within the KPA or China that can help convince the larger organization to cooperate in integration efforts.⁷⁷

Though there are many differences in the German and Korean situations, there are also similarities between the two. First, both the two Koreas and the two Germanys resulted from post-

⁷⁶ Zelikow and Rice, 198-201.

⁷⁷ Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, *Bughan ihae 2017 [Understanding North Korea 2017]*, (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Unification, December 2016), 89-91, 94-99, accessed February 26, 2017, <https://www.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1762&mode=view&page=&cid=47447>; Shepherd Iverson, "How to Stop North Korea: A Geoeconomic Approach," *Forbes* February 28, 2017, accessed March 2, 2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2017/02/28/how-to-stop-north-korea-a-geoeconomic-approach/#8e65c7918f13>. Despite international sanctions stemming from nuclear tests and missile tests, the DPRK maintains a close relationship with China and Russia. Even though China and Russia agree with United Nations sanctions against DPRK, they maintain friendly relations with DPRK. For example, China purchases almost 90 percent of North Korea's exports. Despite of Beijing's discomfort with DPRK's provocations, the China-DPRK trade volume has increased since its first nuclear test in 2006. Russia also supports DPRK through such as donating food to DPRK in February and July 2016. In addition, DPRK is continuing to expand exchanges with Cuba, Iran, and other countries in Asia, Africa and Europe. For example, DPRK has endeavored to improve its relations with European countries and has established diplomatic relations with 26 countries including Italy (January 4, 2000), England (December 12, 2000), and Germany (March 1, 2001).

WWII conflicts.⁷⁸ Germany and Korea were divided artificially by the major powers.⁷⁹ After that, the Cold War hardened the division on both nations. Second, West Germany had created an environment of unification based on having stronger social and economic advantages than East Germany. In Korean peninsula, ROK has developed similarly into one of the most powerful nations based on liberal democracy and market economy. Third, the unified Germany has pursued a policy of defending the peace. During the German military integration process, the FRG gave up WMD and fostered forces for peace – it was expressed as no invasive forces, which helped them to obtain the consent of the international community. The ROKA also has raised forces for peace. In accordance with Mutual Defense Treaty that ROK and US signed in 1953, the ROK and US alliance has been steadily preparing the peninsula against foreign aggression. Furthermore, the ROK military has deployed troops to peacekeeping in many countries such as Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Somalia, East Timor, and South Sudan. Fourth, the unified Germany maintained the draft system, which strengthened the country's internal cohesion.⁸⁰ This was one of the national efforts to form a civil-military unity culture in Germany.⁸¹ Similarly, Korea military has supported a conscription. The whole nation maintains conscription system to serve the duty of national defense and not to forget the wounds of war. Both nations, under the same concept of a strong military training for peacekeeping, have a very similar background regarding cultural and social factors.

⁷⁸ Holger Wolf, "Korean Unification: Lessons from Germany," *Peterson Institute of International Economics*, 168-169, accessed October 6, 2016, https://piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/26/9iie2555.pdf.

⁷⁹ After Japan's defeat in WWII in 1945, the Korean peninsula was divided into two countries by the Soviet Union and the United States. Due to the Korean War that occurred five years later, the division of the Korean peninsula has been continuing.

⁸⁰ Federal Ministry of Defense, 26; Timothy Jones, "Germany to suspend compulsory military service," *Deutsche Welle*, May 2011, accessed January 21, 2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/germany-to-suspend-compulsory-military-service/a-6315122>.

⁸¹ Jones, "Germany to suspend compulsory military service." In December, 2010, the leaders of Germany agreed to suspend military conscription as of July 2011.

Considering similarities and differences between two nations, the ROK should study deeply to prepare a proper model for the national reunification in the near future. Germany, through reductions in force levels, overcame the fears of her neighboring nations and achieved the national unification. In contrast, the ROK will need to achieve the reunification through the strengthening of its military power so it can relieve the concerns of its neighbors that it dependent on, and beholding to, other great powers. This is the reason for the unified Korea to have a strong military force. Through this approach, a unified Korea would not be seen as a threat to neighboring countries because of dependence on the Unites States, but as a strong partner in building regional security. In other words, a strong, unified Korea prevents the emergence of a hegemon in Northeast Asia, rather than strengthening one or a few hegemons. If ROK could accomplish this with a blend of military and diplomatic cooperation, the ROK would likely receive not only regional support for a South Korea-led reunification but also active cooperation from its neighbors.

The Desirable Model for Military Integration

Germany also reformed their military structure in order to respond to the new diplomatic environment after reunification. When the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, which centered on the Soviet Union, and Germany began building partnerships with Russia, military threats for Germany had all but disappeared. However, due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the separation of the Eastern European countries, and other crises in Europe, Germany and other European countries have had to rebuild military forces to deal with this new operational environment.⁸² In other words, Germany, right after the unification, faced construction of a new military structure against a shifting environment. Especially, when German troops deployed to Kosovo for peacekeeping operations,

⁸² Jong Cheon Baek, “Dog-il-yeonbang-gun gaehyeog: jaengjeomgwa jeonmang [Bundeswehr Reform: Issues and Prospects],” (Sejong-si, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, October 2000), 3-6, accessed August 12, 2016. http://www.fes-korea.org/media/German%20Unification/Bundeswehrreform_2000-07.pdf.

and saw firsthand their inferiority compared to other European countries such as England and France. Through this experience, Germany realized they could not be recognized internationally with military inferiority.⁸³ Therefore, when it comes to discussing the Korean military integration, it is important not only to have a peaceful transition between two Koreas but also to develop a new understanding of the threats from the international community and its neighbors. Based on the history of Germany since reunification, even though the military integration was successful, preparation for the new missions faced by the Federal Forces of the Germany was inadequate.

If the peaceful military integration on the Korean peninsula were achieved, it would likely be along lines like those of the German model. However, to achieve this desirable integration requires thorough preparation to deal with the intricacies of the Korean situation, rather than assuming the German model can be used without modification. ROK military leaders should prepare detailed military policies for a Korean “Army of Unity” and plan to handle expected and unforeseen conflicts. Through proper development of plans, the ROK military will be ready to adapt as conditions change. For the peaceful integration of both Korean militaries, the following aspects should be considered.

The first aspect, which falls within the realm of international relations, is the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. To pursue regional security and receive support from neighboring nations, the question of the DPRK’s WMD and nuclear weapons should be resolved before completing national unification. One of the biggest reasons why Germany was able to get the support of the international community was by renouncing its need to retain WMD. A unified Korea should also prohibit the possession of nuclear and chemical or biological weapons, and instead develop military tactics and operations methods based on conventional weapon systems. To

⁸³ Jong Cheon Baek, “Dog-il-yeonbang-gun gaehyeog: jaengjeomgwa jeonmang [Bundeswehr Reform: Issues and Prospects],” (Sejong-si, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, October 2000), 2, accessed August 12, 2016. http://www.fes-korea.org/media/German%20Unification/Bundeswehrreform_2000-07.pdf.

be more specific, as concluded in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Proliferation Security Initiative, a unified Korea should aim to prohibit the possession and development of such weapons anywhere on the peninsula.⁸⁴ Moreover, the DPRK's nuclear and WMD must be secured by the appropriate international organizations. Through these efforts, a unified Korea could show robust and protective forces for peace, and could assure the international community that the new combined ROK military is a force that defends peace.

For the same reasons as the German decision not to locate NATO troops in East German territory, the ROK military should avoid the potential threat to the regional security posed by immature relocation plans. After the unification, a unified Korea could operate security units just like running border units in the current military demarcation line. When it comes to operating border defense units or national guards, it is very crucial to consider which type of forces to where. For instance, the two Koreas could agree not to locate United Nations troops north of the current Military Demarcation Line or 38th Parallel, and eventually have those forces completely withdrawn.⁸⁵ In addition, the units placed in the border area between Korea and China, could have more soldiers from the former Korean People's Army. Through this action, based on the knowledge of troops from KPA, it will be possible to carry out security missions in the old North Korea territory while allaying Chinese concerns about the potential of American troops too close to its border. Applying a combined command structure over the troops stationed in the North of the peninsula such as a commander from former KPA officers and a deputy commander from a ROK Army will also be one of the right solutions.

⁸⁴ Kelsey Davenport, "The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) At a Glance," Arms Control Association, June 10, 2013, accessed November 18, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/PSI>.; Lawrence D. Freedman, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, s.v. "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," accessed November 18, 2016, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Treaty-on-the-Non-proliferation-of-Nuclear-Weapons>.

⁸⁵ See Appendix 4. Map of the Korean Peninsula.

Second, ROK military should consider the political aspect of the integration of leaders and the establishment organizations and installations for the new military. For the integration of military internal leadership, ROK military must consider to dealing with KPA leaders who committed crimes against humanity. The ROK military is a group performing a mission to defend liberal democracy. For those who committed such offenses, military leaders should approach with the principle of ensuring justice. When the atmosphere of unification emerged in Germany in late 1989, demands for the democratization of all German people became intense. Likewise, if the mood of unification in the Korean peninsula is heightened, there will be an atmosphere in which the people in North reject the North Korean rulers. Simultaneously, a resentment of North Koreans against the ruling class might be greater than expected. Therefore, in order to establish humanitarian principles, there should be an appropriate punishment for persons committing inhumane acts. In cooperation with other government ministries, the ROK military leaders could improve the human rights situation in North Korea by using the unification negotiation strategy for the national unification of Korea based on humanitarian principles. Through these efforts, North Koreans will be able to integrate smoothly into ROK.

In addition, the ROK military must consider how to prepare new organizations or installations. Like the German example, the ROK military have to establish a preparation unit such as a liaison team or an advance team. The primary task of this team would be to prepare the take-over of the KPA and to prepare a new organizational command structure which might be located in North Korean territory after the unification. In addition, this team would conduct multiple missions such as investigating and assessing the status of KPA troops, weapons, equipment, budgets and facilities. A precise understanding of the power that DPRK possesses will be a solid foundation and a shortcut to a stronger ROK.

Third, the ROK military should consider the social integration aspect of how to accept DPRK soldiers into the ROK military based on a consideration of a size of troops needed for

unified Korea. In the case of Germany, the Federal Forces of the Germany accepted 10,800 former NVA soldiers. After a strict selection process and training, they received the same treatment as the former West German soldiers gradually. Initially, former West Germany soldiers objected strongly to these policies.⁸⁶ However, the Bundeswehr convinced their formations through focused training and finally convinced Western soldiers of the need for political and national integration.

Change in German Troops scale




Figure 4. German Troops size change

Source: Data adapted from Gooryun Kim, *Hanbando tong-il-ui hyogwa [The Effects of the Korea Unification]*, (Seoul, Korea: Korea Institute for National Unification, December 2014), 38, accessed November 14, 2016, <http://repo.kinu.or.kr/bitstream/2015.oak/2336/1/0001469017.pdf>.

When it comes to considering German unification regarding the integration of troops, it might be not a difficult obstacle. Based on this figure above, the size of the West German military was three times bigger than that of the East German military. Therefore, for the Federal Defense Forces, there was to accommodate some of the NVA troops. However, in the case of Korea, the number of DPRK soldiers is almost twice that of ROK soldiers.⁸⁷ The economic gap might also

⁸⁶ Bickford, 268-269.

⁸⁷ See Appendix 1. Comparison of the Military Strength of the Two Koreas.

hinder military integration, but the absorption of twice as many troops can be expected to cause considerable pain as well. It will be impossible to accept most of the former KPA soldiers. Therefore, the Ministry of National Defense should use the lessons of the German military integration to establish systems that ensure the fair treatment of KPA soldiers who are not included in the unified Korean military. Just as the unified German government supported former NVA soldiers, the Ministry of National Defense and government-led initiatives and financial support should be followed. Furthermore, the common view of North Koreans by the South must be considered. The ROK and its allies see the DPRK as their main opponent, but this enduring enmity will only harm integration efforts. As in the case of Germany, ROK soldiers might not accept the integration of former KPA soldiers. Therefore, the ROK military should determine how many the former DPRK troops will be allowed to the unified Korea, how to integrate them into the unified Korea military structure, and how to educate the force to accept these new members. Moreover, the unified Korea and the Ministry of National Defense should plan how to integrate unincorporated soldiers into the larger society.

Fourth, the ROK military should have a discussion about the economic integration aspect regarding the integration of weapons and equipment. The KPA not only has more troops but also equipment that is more than double that of the ROKA.⁸⁸ For the unified Korea, handling and proper integration the weapons and equipment from the KPA will be a key task in military integration. Furthermore, since the KPA has developed and operated its own equipment based on Soviet weapon systems, it is expected that there will be a lot of equipment that will not be compatible with the equipment of the ROK military. Therefore, after an accurate assessment of the weapons and equipment of the KPA, ROK military should clearly categorize for long-term use; provisionally use; and disposal. During this process, ROK military must accurately identify and handle KPA's

⁸⁸ See Appendix 1. Comparison of the Military Strength of the Two Koreas.

WMD and related facilities. This process also will be the basis for the unified Korea to maintain and develop strong military power in the future.

Fifth, and most importantly, the ROK military should maintain strong combat readiness. The division issue on the Korean peninsula is different from the German division. Germany was divided into East and West due to how the nation was partitioned following WWII. However, the division of Korean peninsula came from the invasion of foreign powers due to weak military power. If the ROK has robust military forces based on the alliance with the United States and other neighboring nations, the ROK could not only protect her nation but also contribute to regional peace. The modern ROK military is transforming into a military power, but it is still weak in the Northeast Asia. Based on strong conventional warfare capabilities, ROK should develop and maintain military readiness to make the DPRK afraid of the ROK military ability to perform war. This should be accomplished not through the possession of WMD and nuclear weapons, but by developing military tactics and operations capabilities based on the conventional weapon systems so that the legitimacy of the unified Korea can be recognized by the international community.



Figure 5. A model for ROK military to contribute a national reunification

Conclusion

Until now, this paper has examined the process and lessons of the German military integration, which could be applied during military integration between the two Koreas on the Korean peninsula. This paper proposes what the future Korean military leaders need to consider when preparing in order to contribute to a successful national reunification that takes into consideration the political and diplomatic situation around the Korean peninsula.

The German unification model was a deliberate effort to change the thinking of former German citizens through example, by maintaining a liberal democratic system in the West. Over time, it became clear to many in the East that West Germany's political and economic systems were more successful. As the East German state faltered, the East German people brought about revolutionary change through a vote to support unification with the democratic West. Not only ordinary citizens in the East Germany but also members of the East German military appeared ready to accept the Bundeswehr as the military for the unified Germany.

To achieve this peaceful reunification, the West German government began planning for an eventual unification even before such an occurrence seemed possible. The FRG created the Bundeswehr to be a peace loving democratic military focused on defending Germany's freedom rather than as a hostile military force like those that had led the world to war in 1914 and again in 1939. The Bundeswehr has maintained its soldiers as citizen-soldiers through the concept of *Innere Führung*.⁸⁹ Theoretically, after the two World Wars, German forces tried to prevent them from following illegal and inhumane orders, and Bundeswehr soldiers were to see themselves as citizens in uniform.⁹⁰ The reason, which made it possible, was that within the newly founded unified German military structure, leaders adhered to the principle of not separation of military and civil

⁸⁹ Bötzel, "Innere Führung (Leadership and Civic Education) and the Citizen in Uniform."

⁹⁰ Bickford, 267.

society. Even after unification, Germany has maintained the draft system. This effort helps to form a culture of civil-military unity in Germany. The whole nation maintained a conscription system to serve the duty of national defense and not to forget the wounds of war. At the same time, the Bundeswehr, has treated soldiers respectfully as equal citizens based on the historical lessons from two World Wars.

Various measures for peaceful military integration contributed to creating a peaceful social atmosphere amidst the potentially turbulent merging of two militaries steeped in different political ideologies. As unification became increasingly likely, both Germanys, but especially the West Germany, actively discussed and cooperated to create a military integration plan designed to overcome the conflicts inherent since the German division after WWII. The FDR deployed the liaison team to the NVA headquarters to prepare an effective military integration and then established the Federal Forces Eastern Command after the national unification. For the integration of forces and equipment, the unified Germany was able through a transparent process of absorbing NVA troops, reducing troop and equipment numbers to those needed for adequate defense of a unified Germany, and promises to keep NATO partners in only Western areas, to reassure neighboring countries of their continued peaceful intentions. Additionally, the unified German government abandoned the possession of nuclear weapons.

The ideal form of military integration to the Korean peninsula should be stable, peaceful reunification through means much like the German unification model. A peaceful military integration is a prerequisite for peaceful reunification. Moreover, considering that the military is a vital driving factor of national power in the DPRK, the success of military integration determines the success or failure of reunification. In order to achieve an ideal military integration, the ROK should prepare for the future from now on. Considering the international and geopolitical situation around the Korean peninsula, the ROK military should prepare the following matters in national reconciliation for the Korean reunification:

1. Securing support from the international community by adopting a position that nuclear weapons and other WMD should be banned from the peninsula, and instead, a unified Korea should pursue a military organized as a national defense force.
2. Planning for the relocation of the units, especially those that will be stationed in former North Korean territory, with the intent of reassuring neighbors of the ROK's peaceful intentions.
3. Dealing justly with KPA leaders who may have committed crimes against humanity.
4. Establishing organizations and installations to facilitate the absorption of KPA forces and equipment into the ROK military.
5. Determining the force required for defense of the entire peninsula and how many KPA soldiers can be brought into a unified ROK military; establishing plans for support to those released from military service.
6. Integrating KPA weapons and equipment into a unified ROK military and determining the proper disposition of those that are not needed or are prohibited.
7. Maintaining strong combat readiness within the ROK military.

In order to achieve a peaceful and progressive unification of the Korean peninsula, national unification should take place without leakage of weapons and ammunition. The containment of nuclear arms and WMD that North Korea currently possesses is key to the stability of the Northeast Asia region. In addition, the ROK military must find the appropriate means to integrate DPRK troops, given that they are more than twice the size of ROK troops, and to care for those whose service will no longer be needed. Plans must be developed to relocate units with consideration to border defense while also assuring neighboring nations. By maintaining strong military readiness while pursuing a sound military culture to ensure freedom and human rights and the defense of liberal democracy, the ROK military could aid in national reconciliation following Korean reunification and also contribute to Northeast Asia's regional security.

Appendix 1: Comparing Military Strength

Table 5. Comparison of the Military Strength of the Two Koreas

Category		South Korea	North Korea
Troops in peacetime	Army	495,000	1,020,000
	Navy	70,000 (including 29,000 Marine Corps troops)	60,000
	Air Force	65,000	120,000
	Total	630,000	1,200,000
Major Forces	Army	Corps (level)	12 (including Special Warfare Command)
		Divisions	44 (including Marine Corps)
		Maneuver brigades	14 (including Marine Corps)
		Tanks	2,400 (including Marine Corps)
	Equipment	Armored vehicles	2,700 (including Marine Corps)
		Cannons	5,600 (including Marine Corps)
		MLRS/MRLs	200
		Ground-to ground missiles	60 (launchers)
	Navy	Combatants	110
		Amphibious ships	10
		Mine warfare vessels	10
		Support and auxiliary vessels	20
	Submarines		10
	Air Force	Combat aircraft	400
		Surveillance & Control aircraft	400
		Transport aircraft	60
		Trainers	50
	Helicopters (Army/Navy/Air Force)		690
	Reserve Troops		3,100,000 (including officer candidates, wartime labor call, and alternative service)
			7,700,000 (including Reserve Military Training Unit, Worker-Peasant Red Guards, and Red Youth Guard)

Source: Data adapted from Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, *Defense White Paper: 2014* (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of National Defense, 2014), 261, accessed November 15, 2016, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblicitn/PBLICNEBOOK_201506161152304650.pdf.

Appendix 2: Range of DPRK's Missiles by Type

Since beginning the development of ballistic missiles in the 1970s, DPRK produced SCUD-B (range of 300 km) and SCUD-C (range of 500 km) missiles in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s, DPRK tested and launched the Nodong missile (range of 1,300 km), while in 2007, it tested the Musudan missile (range of over 3,000 km). With a successful missile capability development, North Korea has gained direct strike capabilities against South Korea, Japan, and other surrounding countries. Moreover, the DPRK tested a Taepodong-1 missile in 1998 and Taepodong-2 in 2006. Since then, DPRK has had the ability to threaten the United States with its long-range missiles.⁹¹




Figure 6. Range of DPRK's Missiles by Type

Source: Data from Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper: 2014 (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of National Defense, 2014), 33, accessed November 15, 2016, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblicitn/PBLICNEBOOK_201506161152304650.pdf.

⁹¹ Kelsey Davenport, "Chronology of U.S.-North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy," Arms Control Association, August 12, 2016, accessed October 18, 2016, <https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron>.

Appendix 3: Northeast Asia Arms Race Map

Since the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, and the collapse of the Cold War system in 1991, people in Europe believed that peace of the world would come. However, the Korean peninsula, due to geographical features, has been facing a new Cold War frontier. This map shows the military strength of the four nations surrounding the Korean peninsula.




Figure 7. Arms race map surrounding the Korean peninsula

Source: Data adapted from Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper: 2014 (Seoul, Korea: Ministry of National Defense, 2014), 15, accessed November 15, 2016, http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/PBLICNEBOOK_201506161152304650.pdf.

Appendix 4: Map of the Korean Peninsula



Figure 8. Map of Korean Peninsula (Military Demarcation Line and 38th Parallel)

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